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INTRODUCTION
In 1892, Congress enacted an in forma pauperis statute that waived
filing fees for indigent litigants so that anyone, regardless of their finan-
cial ability to pay court fees and costs, could bring a federal action.'
* Molly Guptill Manning is the author of the New York Times bestseller, When Books
Went to War: The Stories that Helped Us Win World War II (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2014)
and The Myth of Ephraim Tutt: Arthur Train and His Great Literary Hoax (University of
Alabama Press 2012). She sits on the Board of Editors of the Federal Bar Council Quarterly
and is a regular contributor to that publication. She is a visiting associate professor at New
York Law School and was formerly a supervisory staff attorney for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. She graduated Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Alpha Theta from the
University at Albany, earning B.A. and M.A. degrees in American History. Thereafter she
earned a J.D. from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 341 (1948). As the Supreme
Court observed, the federal in forma pauperis statute opened the courthouse doors to all; no
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Seventy years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, so long as a case
was "not clearly frivolous," in forma pauperis status should be granted,
as "it is our duty to assure to the greatest degree possible . . . equal
treatment for every litigant before the bar." 2 Yet, by the 1990s, federal
courts faced a staggering increase in filings. Civil rights litigation, alone,
experienced a spike from 18,922 actions filed in U.S. district courts in
1990 to 43,278 in 1997.3 Several factors likely contributed to this
trend-from an increasingly litigious society to the expansion of civil
rights law in the early 1990s, including passage of the 1990 Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as well as the
amendment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.4 Congress sought to con-
trol the surge. Despite the fact that imprisoned and non-incarcerated
Americans contributed to the burgeoning federal caseload, prisoners bore
the brunt of remedial legislation.5 The Prison Litigation Reform Act
("PLRA") was Congress's response to the rising tide of civil rights
litigation.
When the PLRA was proposed in 1995, the Act's sponsors
trumpeted its "several important reforms that would dramatically reduce
the number of meritless prisoner lawsuits." 6 By amending the federal in
forma pauperis statute, the PLRA added financial disincentives to filing
federal lawsuits.7 Rather than allow indigent prisoners to file complaints
longer would poverty serve as a barrier because a litigant could not "pay or secure the costs."
Id
2 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962) (internal quotations
omitted).
3 TRACEY KYcIELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Civn. RIGHTS
COMPLAINTS IN U.S DisICT COURTS, 1990-2006 (2008), at 1. According to the March 31,
2001, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, district court civil cases have declined by about 3%
between 1997 and 2001; however, the number of appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals have
been on the rise during the same time period. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2001, "Work
of Federal Judiciary," Pub. Tbl. No. JCI, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-re
ports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2001 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
4 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2018)
(amended 2008); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C and 31-41c U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 2
U.S.C.).
5 The number of federal civil rights complaints filed in district courts by non-prisoners
has nearly doubled between 1990 and 2006. See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN,
U.S. DEPT OF JUST., CivIL RIGHTS CoMPLAINTs IN U.S DIsTIcT COURTS, 1990-2006 (2008),
at 4, tbl. 1 (table, "Federal subject matter jurisdiction of civil rights complaints filed in U.S.
district courts, 1990-2006").
6 141 CONG. REc. 14,413 (1995) (Sen. Bob Dole).
7 See id at 14,571-72 (stating that the PLRA would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and list-
ing the proposed amended language); see also id. at 14,570 (identifying the objectives for
amending §1915, including the dramatic increase in prisoner filings between 1975 and 1994,
the propensity for prisoners to file meritless lawsuits, and the tendency for these actions to "tie
up the courts, waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of justice
enjoyed by the law-abiding population").
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without payment of filing fees, the proposed legislation introduced a gar-
nishment procedure, which ensured payment of all filing fees and costs
over time." Meanwhile, non-incarcerated Americans could continue to
file frivolous lawsuits without prepayment of fees-from alleging that a
fast-food chain's coffee was too hot,9 to asserting private parties im-
planted "tracking chips" to control and monitor the plaintiffs body.10
Prisoners, on the other hand, seeking to complain about the conditions of
their confinement-including the wrongful use of force, inadequate med-
ical care, violation of religious rights, failure to accommodate a disabil-
ity, failure to protect, etc.-would be required to file an in forma
pauperis motion, a financial affidavit alleging indigency, and a certified
copy of their prison trust fund account statement; courts would then be
authorized to periodically deduct funds from the prisoner's account to
satisfy the balance of any filing fee they owed."
The PLRA also amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by adding subsection
(g), known as the "three strikes rule"; it prohibits prisoners from filing
any litigation in forma pauperis (without prepayment of fees) if three or
more actions or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or
for failure to state a claim.1 2 Because dismissal of a complaint and an
appeal therefrom constitute separate strikes, prisoners-most of whom
are untrained in law and are beholden to the resources in a prison law
library to craft legal documents-may accumulate three strikes by filing
two unsuccessful complaints and one appeal.' 3 As there is no time limit
on the three-strikes bar, an indigent "three strikes" prisoner facing a
8 The garnishment provision that was proposed is as follows: "if a prisoner brings a civil
action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. The court shall assess, and when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of
any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of-(A)
the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's account or (B) the average monthly balance in
the prisoner's account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the com-
plaint or notice of appeal." 141 CONG. REC. 14,416 (Sec. 4, (b)(1)) (1995). After payment of
the initial partial fee, "the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent
of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account." Id. (Sec. 4, (b)(2)).
9 See, e.g., Holowaty v. McDonald's Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. Minn. 1998);
Greene v. Boddie-Noelle Enters., 966 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Va. 1997). The number of federal
lawsuits about hot coffee, alone, is surprisingly high.
10 See, e.g., Spence v. Connor, No. 3:10cv1925(MRK), 2010 WL 7865084, at *1 (D.
Conn. 2010) (reviewing complaint alleging that real estate agents and physicians implanted a
tracking chip in plaintiff's body, granting in forma pauperis status, and sua sponte dismissing
complaint for failure to state a claim).
11 141 CONG. REc. 14,416 (Sec. 4. (b)) (1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)-(3)
(2018).
12 See id (proposed language of amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) (2018).
'3 Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2010); Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det.
Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); Hains v. Washington, 131 F.3d 1248,
1250 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996).
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lengthy prison term is effectively prohibited from filing any litigation-
no matter how meritorious-unless able to pay hundreds of dollars in
fees at the time of filing a complaint.14
The only exception to the three strikes rule is if a prisoner alleges
"imminent danger of serious physical injury."15 When courts narrowly
interpret the terms "imminent" and "serious physical injury," only a
trickle of cases are permitted to proceed. 16 For example, a prisoner must
typically allege imminent injury at the time the complaint is filed; this,
however, seems to ignore the reality that a prisoner may not have access
to a pen, paper, and legal resources at the time he or he is facing serious
physical injury.17 Additionally, some courts of appeals have specified
that a three-strikes prisoner must not only allege imminent danger when
a complaint is filed, but must also allege that he continues to face immi-
nent injury at the time his notice of appeal is filed. As one panel of
circuit judges noted, "[ilt is highly improbable that the danger would still
be 'about to' occur at the time of an appeal, following entry of
judgment."18
Because section 1915(g) uses mandatory language-in "no event
shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal" in forma pauperis if the
prisoner has three or more strikes-courts must resolve whatever murky
14 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (setting forth filing fee for district court action, and noting
that additional fees prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States are also collect-
able). As the Third Circuit explained, Congress "has taken away our ability as judges to grant
I.F.P. status to a 'three strikes' prisoner no matter how meritorious his or her subsequent
claims may be, unless the prisoner 'is under imminent danger of serious physical injury' when
he or she 'bring[s] a civil action.' Congress has held trump here, and it has dealt a hand. As
judges we must play it." Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001). The
Third Circuit also noted that allowing prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis to file a corm-
plaint alleging injury as a result of their incarceration "is entirely compatible with the precept
that for any injury, there should be a remedy." Id. Yet, as the Third Circuit ably detailed, the
three strikes rule imposes the danger of, for all practical purposes, barring a prisoner from
bringing a meritorious lawsuit after accumulating three strikes because of the financial impos-
sibility of paying hundreds of dollars in filing fees. Id. at 314-15.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018).
16 Black's Law Dictionary defines "imminent danger" as an "immediate, real threat to
one's safety that justifies the use of force in self-defense" or the "danger resulting from an
immediate threatened injury sufficient to cause a reasonable and prudent person to defend
himself or herself." Imminent Danger, BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The same
dictionary defines "danger" as "[p]eril; exposure to harm, loss, pain, or other negative result."
Danger, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
17 Most Circuit courts have expressly ruled that a prisoner must allege the existence of
imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time the complaint is filed. Asemani v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Services, 797 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Ball v. Famig-
lio, 726 F.3d 448, 467 (3d Cir. 2013); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir.
2007); Ciarpaglin v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003); Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d
559, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2002); Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312; Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d
1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999); Baflos v. O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam);
Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
18 Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 325 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
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§ 1915(g) issues are presented before allowing a case to proceed. 19 Many
courts struggle to determine whether certain dismissals, not couched in
§ 1915(g)'s categories of "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim,"
constitute strikes.20 For example, dismissals on immunity grounds, for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and "mixed" bases-involv-
ing strike grounds and non-strike grounds-are counted as strikes in
some jurisdictions and not in others. 2 1 Even if a prisoner clearly has three
strikes, a court's § 1915(g) review is not over; a court must then consider
if a prisoner faces "imminent danger of serious physical injury." 2 2 In-
stead of allowing courts to use traditional methods to monitor and control
their dockets-including fashioning sanctions to curb litigation by fre-
quent filers-the PLRA instead requires judges to clear the many hurdles
of § 1915(g) before even considering the merits of an action.23
In the end, the PLRA has delivered mixed results in achieving its
aim to decrease prisoner litigation. Although there was an initial decline
in federal prisoner filings between 1996 and 1997, there was a steady
increase from 1999 to 2004; between 1990 and 2006, the number of fed-
eral prisoner lawsuits was at its highest between 2003 and 2005.24 Fed-
eral actions filed by state prisoners sharply declined in 1997, suggesting
the PLRA may have succeeded in its intended effect; filings have since
plateaued and hover around 25,000 state prisoner complaints per year.2 5
While there may be a savings in the number of cases being filed, courts
have faced inefficiencies in resolving complex issues stemming from
§ 1915(g). Circuit splits have developed on a number of issues, and leg-
islative history is of little help because there was no debate about
§ 1915(g) before the PLRA was enacted. Thus, it is impossible to ascer-
tain how legislators envisioned courts to interpret this provision. The Su-
preme Court has considered the three strikes rule on only one occasion. 26
Given the grave consequences that attach to being a three-strikes pris-
oner, and the lack of consensus amongst courts of appeals on how to
19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018).
20 Id.
21 Ball, 726 F.3d at 460-63.
22 Id. at 467.
23 See id. (explaining that court must review to determine whether imminent danger ex-
ception applies in present case); see also Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330-31 (7th Cir.
2003) (delineating the reach and scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
24 See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CIvIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINTS IN U.S DisTRiucT COURTS, 1990-2006 (2008), at 7, fig. 6 (chart, "Federal prisoner
petitions filed in U.S. district court ranged from a low of 910 in 1992 to a high of 1,334 in
2004.").
25 See id. at 7, fig. 5 (chart, "State prison petitions declined after the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1996.").
26 Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015) (holding that "a prisoner who has accu-
mulated three prior qualifying dismissals under § 1915(g) may not file an additional suit in
forma pauperis while his appeal of one such dismissal is pending").
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interpret § 1915(g), the time is ripe for Congress or the Supreme Court to
revisit this provision.
Part I of this article examines the PLRA's legislative history and
considers what Congress aimed to accomplish by amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. Part II focuses on how courts of appeals have interpreted this
statute's "three strikes" language and explores the Circuit splits that have
fissured since the PLRA's passage. Specifically, this article examines
when strikes are counted for immunity-based dismissals, dismissals with-
out prejudice for failure to exhaust, and "mixed" dismissals-based on
both § 1915(g) grounds and non-§ 1915(g) grounds. Part Ill examines
the imminent danger exception, and the varying interpretations across
Circuits. Part IV considers ways that Congress could amend § 1915(g) to
reduce the burden it places on the courts, such as by lifting the indefinite
bar blocking three-strikes prisoners from filing lawsuits no matter their
merit. It also identifies other methods by which courts can manage their
dockets more effectively.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1995, Senator Bob Dole introduced a bill to curb prisoner litiga-
tion regarding prison conditions. 27 "Over the past two decades, we have
witnessed an alarming explosion in the number of lawsuits filed by State
and Federal prisoners," from approximately 6,000 prisoner suits in 1975
to over 39,000 in 1994, he said.28 With "little to lose and everything to
gain," inmates were clogging the courts with lawsuits complaining of
petty discomforts and inconveniences-including "being served creamy
peanut butter instead of the chunky variety they had ordered." 29 Senator
Dole proposed a regime whereby indigent prisoners would no longer be
able to file lawsuits without payment of filing fees. 30 Through a "gar-
nishment procedure," inmates would face an "economic disincentive to
going to court." 31 Specifically, when an indigent prisoner wished to file a
lawsuit, but was unable to pay court fees and costs at the time of com-
mencement, the courts could deduct 20 percent of the funds in the pris-
oner's inmate bank account upon filing, and additional monthly
deductions of 20 percent of the prisoner's income would be garnished
until the full amount of costs and fees was paid. 32
27 141 CONG. REc. 14,570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole, introducing bill to reform
prison litigation, to be called the Prison Litigation Reform).
28 Id.
29 Id. (listing other examples of frivolous lawsuits, such as being deprived of the oppor-
tunity to attend a wedding anniversary party and lacking sufficient storage locker space).
30 See id. at 14,571 (explaining that "[a]s indigents, prisoners are generally not required
to pay the fees that normally accompany the filing of a lawsuit").
31 Id
32 Id.
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Over the next several months, the bill periodically reared its head on
the Senate floor, with an emphasis on the most ludicrous and absurd
prisoner lawsuits ever filed. Senators even compiled several David Let-
terman-style "top ten" lists exploring the most farcical requests for re-
lief.3 3 Cases ran the gamut-melted (not frozen) ice cream had been
served, a unit manager's broadcast of country and western music consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment, Converse sneakers were provided
rather than L.A. Gear or Reebok "pumps," prison physicians implanted
mind control devices, and prison officials confiscated a death row in-
mate's Gameboy. 34 Senators harped on how legislation was needed to
curb the otherwise unchecked propensity for prisoners to file suit any-
time they experienced the slightest offense.35 It was urged that this legis-
lation must be passed to "put an end to the inmate litigation fun-and-
games." 3 6
A lone senator voiced dissent. While there was no doubt that pris-
oner litigation was flooding the courts and some reform was needed, "we
must not lose sight of the fact that some of these lawsuits have merit-
some prisoner's rights are violated," Senator Joe Biden remarked.3 7 He
cited a juvenile detention center that beat children with chains and other
objects, and a correctional facility for women where inmates were
routinely raped by correctional officials-both practices ceased after
lawsuits were filed and courts intervened.38 The bill's sponsors acknowl-
edged that they did "not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate
claims," and stated that the bill would "not prevent those claims from
being raised." 39 However, these assurances were isolated; the remainder
of the sponsors' remarks focused on how prisoners abused the courts by
filing nonsensical lawsuits.
Despite the promise that meritorious suits would not be hindered,
the version of the bill submitted in September 1995 included a provision
that would permanently bar prisoners from filing any civil litigation-
33 Id. at 14,627, 13,629.
34 Id. at 14,629.
35 Senator Harry Reid described several cases he deemed frivolous-including being
denied a "same-sex religious ceremony," being deprived of women's clothing ("[t]his was a
man, of course"), and being forced to wear the wrong size footwear-and expressed frustration
that "[florty percent of the Federal judiciary in Nevada spends their time on this garbage." 141
CONG. REc. 14,627 (1995).
36 Id. at 14,626 (statement by Sen. Bob Dole).
37 Id. at 14,628.
38 See Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Co-
lumbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994) (describing corrective order involving class action by
female prisoners who alleged various civil rights violations); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia,
435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (challenging conditions of confinement at juvenile detention
center).
39 141 CONG. REc. 14,627 (statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch) (1995).
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regardless of merit-without the prepayment of all costs and fees if they
had accumulated "three strikes:"
In no event shall a prisoner in any prison bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal in
a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious bodily
harm.40
This sweeping language, buried in the proposed amendments to
§ 1915, was not debated.41 Yet, it carried severe consequences. No one
seemed to consider how prisoners serving lengthy sentences could effec-
tively lose the ability to raise valid complaints about prison conditions-
including claims of abuse, inadequate medical care, or a violation of their
right to practice a religion-if they first filed insufficient pleadings or
appeals. There was also no discussion of how this rule had the practical
effect of barring litigation; for prisoners with limited or no income, pay-
ment of a $350 filing fee plus other court costs could be an impossibil-
ity.4 2 After all, even today, federal prisoners who are assigned a job
within a correctional facility earn wages as meager as $0.12 per hour.43
Thus, even if an inmate secured a prison job, a statute of limitations
could run before enough money was earned to pay filing costs.4" Finally,
there was no consideration of whether mandatory language-"no pris-
40 Id. at 14,416 (S. 1279, Sec. 7(g)) (1995).
41 After the PLRA was signed into law in 1996, civil liberties advocates were quick to
criticize and question the legislation's utility. In the words of the Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina, the PLRA was "[r]ammed through Con-
gress without hearings or testimony, the law is predicated on bogus facts and proposes phony
solutions." Steven J. Bates, ACLU Will Challenge Constitutionality of Law, GREENVILLE
NEWS, May 21, 1996, at 6A.
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (setting forth filing fee for district court action); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1914, Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees (effective Dec. 1, 2016) (listing
other court costs and fees related to litigation). According to the Judicial Conference Schedule
of Fees, not only would a non-IFP prisoner have to pay the filing fee, but there would also be a
$50 administrative fee for filing a civil action in the district court. See id. ¶ 14.
43 See FEDERAL BuREAu OF PRISONS, Work Programs, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
custody-and care/workprograms.jsp (last visited December 3, 2018).
44 See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 124 (2005) (reaffirming
that all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are governed by the most analogous state statute of limita-
tions). Circuit courts have routinely rejected challenges to § 1915(g)'s constitutionality, essen-
tially determining that § 1915(g) does not bar prisoner litigation, "it merely prohibits
[prisoners] from enjoying IFP status." Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Polanco v. Hopkins,
510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007); Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 2002);
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); Higgins v. Carpen-
ter, 258 F.3d 797, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-81 (9th
Cir. 1999); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232-35 (10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Yaklich,
148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998).
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oner shalr'-was necessary, or if there were less burdensome alterna-
tives to dealing with frequent filers than requiring courts to both identify
three strikes and ascertain whether a prisoner faced imminent danger. 4 5
In the end, with minimal congressional guidance, district and circuit
courts have been left to interpret § 1915(g) and attempt to discern strikes
and imminent danger. Inharmonious opinions have resulted.
H. THREE SnIuKES
A. Statutory Groundwork
Before a prisoner is barred from bringing actions in forma pauperis,
a court must determine that the inmate has filed three or more actions or
appeals that have been dismissed for the reasons stated in § 1915(g). 4 6
The unexacting terminology of § 1915(g) renders this endeavor diffi-
cult.4 7 The statute does not define the terms "frivolous," "malicious," or
"fails to state a claim." Orders of dismissal do not always invoke these
specific terms, requiring courts to evaluate whether certain types of dis-
missals should be construed as falling under § 1915(g). 4 8 While some of
this guesswork could be eliminated if the court dismissing an action had
to determine whether its dismissal constituted a strike, some circuits have
held that courts should refrain from taking such action. The rationale for
45 Most Circuits have recognized that a filing injunction (preventing a litigant from filing
future complaints or appeals without first seeking leave of the court) "is appropriate when a
plaintiff 'abuse[s] the process of the Courts to harass and annoy others with meritless, frivo-
lous, vexatious or repetitive ... proceedings." Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
2000) (quoting In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also
Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1063-66 (9th Cir. 2014); Qureshi
v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 2010); Cromer v. Kraft Foods North America,
Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818-19 (4th Cir. 2004); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1982); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st
Cir. 1980).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018).
47 The statute provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .
Id.
48 See Furnace v. Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (declining to assess a
strike against a litigant because "'district courts do not issue these strikes one by one, in their
orders of judgment,' because nothing in the PLRA requires them to do so," and "nothing in the
PLRA requires us to do so at this time," and explaining that it is not until a defendant raises a
three-strikes argument that the court will then determine if a prisoner has three strikes) (quot-
ing Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Snider v. Melindez,
199 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "it would be well for a court entering an order of
dismissal to see to it that the record and judgment clarify the [basis for dismissal] for the
future. The judgment should clearly state the reasons for the dismissal, including whether the
dismissal is because the claim is 'frivolous,' 'malicious,' or 'fails to state a claim' .... ").
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this policy is that, unless and until a prisoner has three strikes, there is no
practical consequence for announcing that a prisoner has one or two; a
premature strike designation could be contested, prolonging litigation
over an issue that may never become ripe.49
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the meaning of
§ 1915(g)'s three categories of strikes. At most, the Court has dealt with
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), which describes the same categories of cases. The latter
provision permits courts to dismiss a case at any time-regardless of
whether a filing fee has been paid in whole or in part-if it is determined
that: "(B) the action or appeal- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."50 When the
Supreme Court was forced to give meaning to the term "frivolous" under
§ 1915(e)(2),51 the Court complained that the "brevity . .. and the gener-
ality of [the statute's] terms have left the judiciary with the not inconsid-
erable tasks of fashioning the procedures by which the statute operates
and of giving content to § 1915[ ]'s indefinite adjectives." 52 The Court
further remarked that neither the statute nor Congress provided any gui-
dance on how to define § 1915(e)(2)'s inexact language.53 Nevertheless,
in a decision predating the passage of the PLRA and the enactment of
§ 1915(g), the Supreme Court fashioned its own definition: a complaint
"is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."5 4
49 See Snider, 199 F.3d at 115 (stating that the "designation of strikes has no practical
consequences until a defendant in a prisoner's lawsuit raises the contention that the prisoner's
suit or appeal may not be maintained in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because
the prisoner has accumulated three strikes").
50 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (2018). The Supreme Court presumes that "identi-
cal words used in different parts of the same statute" carry "the same meaning." IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2006). It is noteworthy that immunity, identified under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), is not specifically listed in § 1915(g). Thus, if a dismissal does not spec-
ify under which subsection of § 1915(e)(2)(B) it falls, it quickly becomes difficult to ascertain
whether the dismissal is on strike grounds, is a "mixed" dismissal (on strike and non-strike
grounds), or is wholly based on immunity and thus may not be a strike at all.
51 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1989). The version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
that was in effect at the time Neitzke was decided is considerably different from the present-
day statute. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1989) ("The court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation
of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (2018) ("Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-(A) the
allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.").
52 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25.
53 Id. at 325.
54 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (1989) (explaining that the term "frivolous" encompasses
"not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation"). Several
Circuits have cited Neitzke in the course of analyzing whether a dismissal constitutes a "strike"
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Given the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing
throughout a statute,"55 the definition for "frivolous" should be the same
under § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(g). 5 6
Still, the meaning of the "remaining strike grounds" remains ambig-
uous, as neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have considered them.
The burden has largely fallen on federal courts of appeals to wrangle
over the parameters of the terms "malicious" and "fails to state a claim."
As to the former term, slightly different meanings have been adopted
across the country. The Third Circuit requires a "subjective inquiry into
the litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to deter-
mine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defen-
dant." 5 7 The Fifth Circuit has pegged duplicative lawsuits to be
malicious under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 58 The Eighth Circuit has interpreted
"malicious" to apply to situations where pleadings included knowing
false allegations, or abusive and disrespectful language. 59 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, relying on Webster's Third New International Dictionary, has stated
an action is malicious if it is "filed with the 'intention or desire to harm
another.' "60
As to the phrase "fails to state a claim," the Supreme Court has
cautioned that a complaint that is dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
on the grounds of frivolousness. Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir. 2007); Day v.
Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999); Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3d Cir.
1998); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998). However, it should be noted that
the Second Circuit's reliance on Neitzke in Tafari may be misplaced, as the parenthetical that
follows the citation to Neitzke states that the latter case was "emphasizing that 'not all unsuc-
cessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g)."' Tafari, 473 F.3d at 443. The quoted lan-
guage does not appear in Neitzke-nor does any reference to § 1915(g) appear because Neitzke
preceded the passage of the PLRA (and § 1915(g)) by 7 years.
55 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
56 It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that "this presumption is not
absolute" and it "yields readily to indications that the same phrase . .. is one that speakers can
easily use in different ways without risk of confusion." Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 484
(2010). However, Circuit courts generally ascribe to the view that the presumption applies to
§ 1915. See, e.g., Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that
"three separate provisions of the PLRA" contains the phrase "fails to state a claim" and that
when a district court invokes one of them, the dismissal constitutes a strike. The three provi-
sions are: (1) § 1915(g); (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which "directs the district court to
dismiss the complaint of any plaintiff proceeding informa pauperis if the court determines that
the complaint 'fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted'"; and (3) 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which "directs the district court to dismiss the complaint of a prisoner if it fails to
state a claim").
57 Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995).
58 Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993).
59 See In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (using disre-
spectful and abusive language); Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212, 213 (8th Cir. 1984)
(involving false accusations, and a pattern of vexatious and abusive pleadings).
60 Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines "malicious" as "(s]ubstantially certain to cause injury" or "[w]ithout just cause or ex-
cuse." Malicious, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Procedure 12(b)(6) (which governs motions to dismiss for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted") 61 is not automatically
frivolous under § 1915(e)(2). 62 Most circuit courts have nevertheless
drawn parallels between Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(g). The District of
Columbia Circuit has ruled that when a district court dismisses a com-
plaint under Rule 12(b)(6), "thus concluding that the complaint fails to
state a claim, section 1915(g)'s plain text compels us to count that case
as a strike." 63 The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that "if a claim is
dismissed for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6), it counts as a
strike for PLRA purposes," and the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have
invoked analogous reasoning.64 Yet, the Third Circuit has attributed
"some persuasive effect" to an argument that Rule 12(b)(6) and
§ 1915(g) are distinct, as the former uses the clause "fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted" and the latter states "fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted."65 Thus, there is no consensus
regarding the pertinence of Rule 12(b)(6) to a three-strikes analysis under
§ 1915(g).
Considering the varying meanings that have been attributed to
§ 1915(g)'s strike language, it should come as no surprise that an impres-
sive array of issues involving the application of these words has plagued
courts and frustrated the PLRA's aims to lessen the strain on the judici-
ary. Trying to figure out whether a prisoner has accumulated three strikes
can involve extensive analysis that yields no definitive answers. How-
ever, because § 1915(g) uses mandatory language, courts are forced to
first tackle the question of whether three strikes exist. Three of the most
contested issues amongst federal courts of appeals are discussed below.
They are whether a strike is warranted for: (1) immunity-based dismis-
sals, (2) dismissals without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and (3) "mixed" dismissals-on § 1915(g) grounds and non-
§ 1915(g) grounds.
B. Immunity
When a district court dismisses an action sua sponte or in the early
stages of litigation, it is common for the court to cite the relevant portion
61 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
62 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 320 (1989).
63 Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
64 El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Rivera v. Allin,
144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir.
2009) (remarking that § 1915(g)'s "fails to state a claim" language "closely tracks the lan-
guage of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)," and determining that the treatment of
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) is instructive for purposes of counting strikes under § 1915(g)).
65 Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
TROUBLE COUNTING TO THREE
of § 1915(e)(2)(B) in support. 66 Any guesswork as to how to classify a
dismissal can be eliminated when a district court specifies that an entire
action fails under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii), both of which are categori-
cally strike grounds.67 However, when a dismissal order cites
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which governs dismissals on immunity grounds, cir-
cuit courts diverge on whether the dismissal can count as a strike.68 The
same is true when a dismissal order cites to the broad umbrella of
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)-which includes immunity-without specifying on
what grounds the case is being dismissed.
Circuits have reached different conclusions about whether immunity
alone should serve as an exclusive basis for a strike. The Second Circuit
has held that dismissals based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and
judicial immunity are akin to frivolous dismissals, and they are strikes
under § 1915(g). 69 The Ninth Circuit has ruled in an unpublished memo-
randum decision that when a qualified immunity defense is apparent on
the face of the complaint, and a case is dismissed under Federal Rule of
66 See, e.g., Milan v. Wetheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that the
district court sua sponte dismissed a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for
failure to state a claim); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1158 (11th Cir. 2003) (reviewing
district court's sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (e)(2)(B)(ii),
of prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting the district court sua sponte dismissed prisoner's civil rights action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
223 (3d Cir. 2000) (reviewing district court sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and likening the "failure to state a claim" standard under that statute to a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal).
67 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2018), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018).
68 But see Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) (hold-
ing that when an "immunity ground for dismissal was subsumed in frivolousness or appellant's
failure to state a claim, because appellant affirmatively asserted facts showing that he could
not meet [an exception to a party's immunity], so he had no 'legally viable claim[.]"').
69 See, e.g., Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that dismissal
based on absolute prosecutorial immunity is a strike); Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d
Cir. 2011) (holding that "[alny claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is
'frivolous' for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)."). The Second Circuit has not considered
whether other immunity determinations-such as qualified immunity--could similarly be
deemed a strike. In a footnote in Collazo, the Second Circuit narrowed its holding. Specifi-
cally, the Court stated:
We recognize that, unlike absolute judicial immunity, absolute prosecutorial immu-
nity can be difficult to adjudicate.... We also recognize that a pro se plaintiff is
unlikely to be able to distinguish between a meritorious and a frivolous case in many
instances. We therefore limit our holding to dismissals for that readily distinguisha-
ble heartland of immune prosecutorial conduct that was spelled out by the Supreme
Court twenty years ago in Bums-conduct that is 'intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.' . . . Accordingly, our holding does not ex-
tend to cases in which the claimed injury arises ou[t] of investigatory or other non-
immune conduct by a prosecutorFalse Neither does it extend to cases in which the
complaint is not dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Collazo, 656 F.3d at 134 n.2 (quoting Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)) (other internal
citations omitted).
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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it may constitute a strike.70 On the other hand,
the Eighth Circuit has rejected the proposition that an action dismissed
because of prosecutorial immunity is a strike, and the Third Circuit has
held that absolute immunity cannot form the basis for a strike.71
These differing outcomes could be reconciled if the Supreme Court
or Congress clarify whether § 1915(g) should be interpreted narrowly, or
if courts have discretion to consider the character of a dismissal in deter-
mining whether it fits within the "strike" criteria. For example, the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits acknowledge that immunity is not specifically
mentioned in § 1915(g), but reason that when the basis for dismissal is
obvious, it is essentially frivolous--even if the district court did not label
it So. 7 2 The Eighth Circuit interprets § 1915(g) more literally, reasoning
that because the three-strikes rule omits immunity as a basis for a strike,
it is improper for a court to hold otherwise.73 And, the Third Circuit
seems to adopt a hybrid approach. It reasons that immunity dismissals do
"not constitute a PLRA strike, including a strike based on frivolousness,
unless a court explicitly and correctly concludes that the complaint
reveals the immunity defense on its face and dismisses the unexhausted
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or expressly states that the ground for the
dismissal is frivolousness." 74 Thus, the Third Circuit has left open the
possibility that an immunity-based dismissal could constitute a strike, but
the onus is on the court dismissing an action to explicitly weave one of
the § 1915(g) grounds (frivolous, malicious, failure to state a claim) into
the language of its order. Until the Supreme Court or Congress acts,
courts will likely continue to reach differing conclusions as to whether an
immunity-based dismissal may constitute a strike.
C. Exhaustion
The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing an action in federal court.75 A failure to exhaust these
remedies typically results in a dismissal of a federal complaint without
70 Reberger v. Baker, 657 F. App'x 681, 684 (9th Cir. 2016).
71 Castillo-Alvarez v. Krukow, 768 F.3d 1219, 1220 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding dismissal
based on prosecutorial immunity was not a strike under § 1915(g)); Ball v. Famigio, 726 F.3d
448, 463 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[W]e hold that dismissal based on the immunity of the defendant,
whether absolute or qualified, does not constitute a PLRA strike.").
72 See Collazo, 656 F.3d at 134; Mills, 645 F.3d at 177; Reberger, 657 F. App'x at 684.
73 See Castillo-Alvarez, 768 F.3d at 1220 ("Dismissals based on immunity are not among
the types of dismissals listed as strikes in section 1915(g), and ... the dismissal of this action
is not a strike under section 1915(g)."); Ball, 726 F.3d at 463.
74 Ball, 726 F.3d at 463.
75 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison condi-
tions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.").
TROUBLE COUNTING TO THREE
prejudice to refiling once exhaustion is achieved. Whether such a dismis-
sal is a strike depends on the circuit analyzing the issue.
As the language of § 1915(g) does not specifically mention exhaus-
tion as a basis for a strike, courts typically look to whether a dismissal
order invokes the language that the action or appeal was "frivolous,"
"malicious," or "fails to state a claim." 76 Circuits that adopt the most
literal and narrow interpretation of § 1915(g) generally hold that dismis-
sal for failure to exhaust should not count as a strike.7 7 Other courts
consider whether the failure to exhaust is tantamount to filing a frivolous
or malicious action, or whether the failure to exhaust is akin to a determi-
nation that a complaint fails to state a claim.78
The Second Circuit was one of the first Circuits to address the issue
of whether a dismissal on exhaustion grounds should constitute a strike.
The Court held that an exhaustion-based dismissal could not constitute a
strike because the "[flailure to exhaust administrative remedies is often a
temporary, curable, procedural flaw," and that "a prisoner who brings
suit without having exhausted these remedies can cure the defect simply
by exhausting them and then reinstituting his suit."7 9 Because exhaustion
has no bearing on the underlying merits of a claim, and exhaustion is
"curable," the Second Circuit ruled that § 1915(g) was not "meant to
impose a strike upon a prisoner who suffers a dismissal because of the
prematurity of his suit."80 The Court specifically stated that § 1915(g)'s
reference to "fails to state a claim" did not encompass a failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies.8 1
The Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit's holding, stating that
''a routine dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does
not amount to a strike." 82 However, the Fourth Circuit employed differ-
76 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018).
77 See, e.g., Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1999).
78 See, e.g., Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court
has considered whether exhaustion must be sufficiently pleaded in a prisoner complaint (a
requirement that the Sixth Circuit once imposed), or if it is an affirmative defense. The Su-
preme Court ruled that the Sixth Circuit incorrectly required prisoners to plead exhaustion, and
that it is an affirmative defense. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). In doing so, the
Supreme Court noted that while the PLRA broadened the grounds for sua sponte dismissal (for
actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary damages from a
defendant immune from such relief), exhaustion is notably omitted from this more expansive
framework. See id. at 214.
79 Snider, 199 F.3d at 111-12.
80 Id. The Second Circuit has similarly ruled that an appeal taken from a non-final order
is also a "curable" flaw that should not generate a strike. See Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 443
(2d Cir. 2007).
81 See Snider, 199 F.3d at 112. The Second Circuit noted, however, that if a failure to
exhaust might "permanently bar[ ] the suit," a different outcome might be appropriate. Id.
However, because this posture was not presented, this reasoning is arguably dicta. See id.
82 Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 408 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635
F.3d 646, 653-54 (4th Cir. 2011) (addressing argument that prisoners could "immunize" them-
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ent reasoning to get to this conclusion. Adopting a narrow interpretation
of § 1915(g), the Fourth Circuit explained that the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement was passed in the same breath as § 1915(g), and it was sig-
nificant that the latter provision omitted exhaustion grounds as a basis for
a strike.83 The Third Circuit has ruled that dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies cannot constitute a strike unless a court's order
of dismissal explicitly states the complaint failed to state a claim." 84 The
Seventh Circuit has also joined this faction.85
Other circuits have determined that a failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies can constitute a strike. The District of Columbia Circuit
has ruled that when "a court dismisses an unexhausted complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6), thus concluding that the complaint fails to state a claim,
[§] 1915(g)'s plain text compels us to count that case as a strike," but
when the "failure to exhaust is treated as an affirmative defense and ap-
pears nowhere on the face of the complaint, the defense will not be raised
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the dismissal will not count as a strike."86
Under this reasoning, it would serve a prisoner well to avoid discussing
exhaustion in a complaint. The Sixth Circuit has reasoned that when
some claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, it is
appropriate to treat the dismissal as a strike so long as the dismissal order
does not indicate that any claims have merit.87
selves from the three strikes rule by adding an unexhausted claim to a complaint, and ruling
that if a prisoner were to take such an action, a strike could be appropriate on the grounds of
malice or frivolousness).
83 Green, 454 F.3d at 409.
84 Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 460 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated in part by Coleman v.
Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). The Ball court seems to focus on whether the dismis-
sal of a complaint on exhaustion grounds can be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, or if exhaus-
tion is too complicated to be obvious at the early stages of litigation. See id.
85 See Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1013 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that "the dismissal
of an action for failure to exhaust . .. does not incur a strike."). Turley further noted that, as the
Sixth Circuit had reasoned, "a dismissal for failure to plead adequately exhaustion is distinct
from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, and neither the dismissal of a complaint in its
entirety for failure to exhaust nor the dismissal of unexhausted claims from an action contain-
ing other viable claims constitutes a strike under § 1915(g)." Id. (citing Pointer v. Wilkinson,
502 F.3d 369, 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2007)).
86 Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The District of Columbia
Circuit's focus is on whether the dismissal can fall under the language of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See id. It further clarifies this point by remarking, in dicta, that if exhaustion was a
jurisdictional requirement, "then the court will dismiss the unexhausted complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) and the dismissal will not count as a strike." Id.
87 Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 2007). Admittedly, it is difficult to
pinpoint the Sixth Circuit's exact stance when it comes to exhaustion-based dismissals. While
Pointer involved a "mixed" dismissal-involving a single decision based on § 1915(g)
grounds and non-§ 1915(g) grounds-it squarely ruled that when a court relied even in part on
a failure to exhaust in support of dismissal, this still constituted a strike. Id. The Pointer court
distinguished the Second Circuit's reasoning in Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d at 115, stating
that "Snider addresses the status of a dismissal entirely without prejudice, whereas [the Sixth
Circuit was examining a dismissal] in part with prejudice." Pointer, 502 F.3d at 374-75. The
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It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting directions that the courts of
appeals have taken with respect to exhaustion. In general, it seems ex-
haustion can be treated as a basis for a strike if the fact of non-exhaustion
is obvious from the face of the complaint and thus renders the complaint
frivolous or unable to state a claim. Admittedly, this ignores the Second
Circuit's cogent point that exhaustion is usually curable, and the failure
to exhaust has no bearing on whether the underlying claims may have
merit once they are exhausted. Many courts have also acknowledged that
exhaustion can be difficult to determine, and this weighs in favor of not
treating a failure to exhaust as a basis for a strike.88
D. Mixed Dismissals
Immunity and exhaustion are two issues that further complicate yet
another common problem that arises in three strikes cases: "mixed dis-
missals." Courts have defined "mixed dismissals" as "those dismissals
that are based in part on a § 1915(g) ground, and in part on other
grounds."89 Circuit courts are split on whether a mixed dismissal should
count as a § 1915(g) strike. On the one hand, if § 1915(g) is read nar-
rowly, it would suggest that a strike arises only when an entire action or
appeal is dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a
claim.90 On the other hand, some circuits have expressed concern that
prisoners could circumvent § 1915(g) by simply adding unexhausted
claims, or claims involving immune defendants, so that a portion of an
action or appeal cannot be dismissed on the enumerated grounds in
§ 1915(g). 91
Sixth Circuit also focused on Snider's consideration of whether exhaustion is curable and
possibly a permanent bar. Id. at 375. Despite the hardline approach taken in Pointer, an unpub-
lished Sixth Circuit case that was decided the following year determined that sua sponte dis-
missals for failure to specifically plead exhaustion of administrative remedies were not strikes.
Feathers v. McFaul, 274 F. App'x 467, 469 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Snider, 199 F.3d at 112).
88 See, e.g., Millhouse v. Sage, 639 F. App'x 792, 794 (3d Cir. 2016).
89 See, e.g., Byrd v. Shannon, 709 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2013).
90 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018) (emphasis added) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a
civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions . . . brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim . . . .").
91 See, e.g., Pointer, 502 F.3d at 374 ("the congressional purpose of § 1915(g) would be
subverted if, by adding unexhausted claims to a complaint that otherwise does not state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, a prisoner could repeatedly escape imposition of a strike
and thus evade the bar imposed by the three-strikes rule"). The Pointer court's reliance on
"congressional purpose" is somewhat disingenuous, as there was no congressional debate
about the language of purpose of § 1915(g). Presumably, the Sixth Circuit was referring to the
congressional debates about the PLRA as a whole. However, those debates did not clarify
whether Congress intended to have prisoners accumulate strikes only when filing the most
frivolous litigation (such as the actions that made it into Senator's "top ten" lists), leaving
prisoners with some opportunity to still avail themselves of in forma pauperis status. 141
CoNG. REc. 14,627, 13,629 (listing "top ten" prisoner lawsuits based on frivolousness). On
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Most circuits have explicitly considered whether "mixed dismis-
sals" constitute strikes. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits favor the view that
mixed dismissals can be strikes. 92 The Sixth Circuit confronted the issue
of mixed dismissals in considering whether a strike accrues when a dis-
trict court dismisses several counts with prejudice for failure to state a
claim, and other counts without prejudice for failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies.93 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "although some
claims were dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, none of
the claims were found to have merit or to state a claim," and section
"1915(g) contemplates that such a meritless filing be deemed a strike."94
However, this ignores that a determination that claims were unexhausted
is not akin to a determination that the unexhausted claims lack merit. The
Sixth Circuit seemed to adopt the contrapositive of this idea, stating that
the "inclusion of unexhausted claims in a complaint in which all other
counts fail to state a claim will not 'inject merit into the action' and
transform counts that do not state a claim into ones that do."95 Thus, a
dismissal without prejudice to refiling after exhaustion-at least when
grouped with other meritless claims-was a strike.96 The Sixth Circuit,
the other hand, the debates over the PLRA also indicate a general frustration with the increas-
ing burden on courts, and it is possible that legislators intended to severely limit prisoners'
ability to file actions. 141 CONG. REc. S7,524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (citing the burden on
the courts).
92 Thomas v. Parker, 672 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2012) (adopting the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Pointer and determining that a district court's mixed dismissal-whereby two
counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim and the remaining sixteen counts were dis-
missed, by summary judgment motion, for failure to exhaust-constituted a strike); Pointer,
502 F.3d at 376.
93 Pointer, 502 F.3d at 370 (describing the district court dismissal in Pointer v. Jorgen-
sen-Martinez, No. 00-861 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2000), in which "the district court dismissed all
eight counts of Pointer's complaint," but had "dismissed only six of them with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," and had dismissed the other two
counts "without prejudice to refiling because Pointer had failed to exhaust all available prison
administrative remedies").
94 Id. at 373-74. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning seems flawed. A determination that an
action contains unexhausted claims has no bearing on whether the underlying claims-when
exhausted-may have merit. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in evaluating the PLRA exhaustion
requirement, has stated that there are two main purposes to administrative exhaustion: (1) an
agency is provided with the opportunity to correct its own mistakes, with the possibility of
federal legal proceedings serving as a deterrent for an agency to disregard its own policies and
procedures; and (2) it promotes efficiency by availing an agency of the opportunity to rectify a
grievance internally rather than forcing it into a federal court in the first instance. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-91 (2006). The Supreme Court seems to contemplate PLRA exhaustion
as a procedural hurtle to securing merits review of a claim in federal court; it does not discuss
exhaustion as involving any type of merits-based determination. Id.
95 Pointer, 502 F.3d at 373 (quoting Clemons v. Young, 240 F. Supp. 2d 639, 641 (E.D.
Mich. 2003)).
96 Id. The Tenth Circuit essentially adopts this same reasoning. Day v. Maynard, 200
F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ("a dismissal without prejudice counts as a strike,
so long as the dismissal is made because the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim"). In reaching this determination, the Tenth Circuit relied on Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d
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arguably in dicta, remarked that when a dismissal for failure to exhaust
was coupled with a determination that some claims had merit, the dismis-
sal could not constitute a strike.97 At bottom, the Sixth Circuit's analysis
suggests that if a dismissal order indicates that there may be some merit
to any claim, a dismissal of some claims cannot constitute a strike; how-
ever, if there is no merit to some claims, and other claims are dismissed
without prejudice, the dismissal may still constitute a strike.9 8 The Tenth
Circuit has found the Sixth Circuit's reasoning persuasive. 99
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits disagree with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits.100 The backbone of their
reasoning is that a strike exists only when an entire dismissal is on§ 1915(g) grounds, as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. The
Seventh Circuit confronted a mixed dismissal in which a portion of a
719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998), in which the Eleventh Circuit treated as a strike a dismissal without
prejudice when a complaint failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies. Specifi-
cally, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a "claim that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of
remedies is tantamount to one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id.
The Supreme Court, however, has since ruled that "failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense
under the PLRA, and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in
their complaints." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus, it would follow that a
prisoner's failure to allege exhaustion in a complaint is not tantamount to failing to state a
claim. Id. The Supreme Court's holding in Jones therefore calls into question the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits' reasoning regarding "without prejudice" dismissals on exhaustion grounds
and whether they can be treated as strikes.
97 Id. at 372 (quoting Clemons, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 641-42).
98 Id. at 372-74.
99 Thomas v. Parker, 672 F.3d 1182, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2012) (adopting the proposition
that "a strike can properly be assessed under § 1915(g) when ... the plaintiffs claims are
dismissed in part for failure to state a claim and in part for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and no claims are allowed to proceed on the merits."). Curiously, the Tenth Circuit
also considered the case law from other Circuits holding that section 1915(g)'s reference to the
dismissal of "actions" and not "claims" resulted in the "well established [principle] that a
partial dismissal based on one of the grounds enumerated in § 1915(g) is generally not a
proper basis for assessing a strike." Id. at 1183 (citing Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 432
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2010); Tolbert v. Stevenson,
635 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2011)). The Tenth Circuit did not attempt to reconcile the fact that
failure to exhaust is not an enumerated ground in § 1915(g). Nor did the Tenth Circuit identify
which of the enumerated grounds-frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim-a
failure to exhaust is subsumed into. Id. at 1183-84. The Tenth Circuit instead seemed to sug-
gest that if the majority of a case is dismissed on strike grounds, and no claim is specified as
having merit, a strike may be generated. Id. at 1184 (explaining that a strike was not imposed
"due to the prisoner's failure to exhaust," but, rather, "because the prisoner had asserted sev-
eral claims that failed to state a claim for relief' in addition to unexhausted claims).
100 Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016);
Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 124-25 (3d Cir. 2013); Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1013
(7th Cir. 2012); Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 652 (4th Cir. 2011); Thompson, 492 F.3d
at 432. The Fifth Circuit, albeit indirectly, also seems to ascribe to the view that a partial
dismissal on strike grounds does not generate a strike. See Powells v. Minnehaha Cty. Sheriff
Dep't, 198 F.3d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a litigant no longer had three strikes
after Circuit reversal, and observing, parenthetically, that the dismissal of a claim is not the
equivalent of dismissal of an "action," the latter of which is required by § 1915(g)).
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case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the remaining portion
was dismissed at the summary judgment phase for failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies.101 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Sixth
Circuit's position that a partial dismissal on exhaustion grounds could
still support a strike, but ruled that a "failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is statutorily distinct from his failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted."10 2 Further, considering the plain language
of the statute, the court stated: "Section 1915(g) literally speaks in terms
of prior actions that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure
to state a claim. The statute does not employ the term 'claim' to describe
the type of dismissal that will incur a strike." 103 This reasoning was in
accord with a Supreme Court case that considered 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
a provision of the PLRA, and distinguished the meaning of the terms
"action" and "claim."1 04 Specifically, the Supreme Court stated: "statu-
tory references to an 'action' have not typically been read to mean that
every claim included in the action must meet the pertinent requirement
before the 'action' may proceed."105 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that, "consistent with the plain language of the PLRA, ... dismissal
of an action, in part for failure to exhaust and in part as frivolous, mali-
cious or for failure to state a claim does not constitute a strike under
§ 1915(g)."1o6
The Fourth Circuit has expanded on the "plain meaning" of the
PLRA to hold that a mixed dismissal can never support a strike.107 Like
the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit emphasized § 1915(g)'s use of the
terms "action or appeal," and not the word "claim." 108 Drawing off of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Fourth Circuit cited Rules 1, 2, 3,
and 54(b), all of which use the term "action" to refer to "an entire
101 Turley, 625 F.3d at 1013 (evaluating whether a strike is properly assessed when "the
district court dismissed [an action] in part for failure to state a claim and in part for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies," with the latter partial dismissal occurring "at summary
judgment").
102 Id. (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 211-12). The Seventh Circuit acknowledges Pointer's
rationale that when a failure to exhaust is coupled with viable claims, the dismissal is not a
strike. Id. However, Turley expands greatly on this principle and reaches a contrary holding
from the Sixth Circuit. Id.
103 Id. at 1008. In support of this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that the terms
"action" and "claim" "have well-defined meanings in the pleading context." Id. (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 3, 8(a), 18(a)).
104 Id. at 1009 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 221).
105 Id. The Ninth Circuit has also relied on Jones's interpretation of another provision of
the PLRA to conclude that "action" and "claim" are distinct terms of art that should not be
used interchangeably. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007).
106 Turley, 625 F.3d at 1009.
107 See Tolbert, 635 F.3d at 651.
108 See id. at 650.
TROUBLE COUNTING TO THRE 2
suit."109 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that section 1915(g) attributed the
same meaning to the term "action" as the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure did.1 10 In further support, the Fourth Circuit highlighted four other
subsections of § 1915 that used the word "action" and determined that
this word consistently referred to an "entire suit"; accordingly, when
§ 1915(g) referred to an "action," principles of statutory construction re-
quired that the term carry the same meaning.11 ' Other circuits have fo-
cused less on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other subsections
of § 1915 and have instead focused on the plain language of § 1915(g)
itself. The District of Columbia Circuit has reasoned that 1915(g)
"speaks of the dismissal of 'actions and appeals,' not 'claims,'" and thus
"actions containing at least one claim falling within none of the three
strike categories . . . do not count as strikes."11 2 The Ninth and Third
Circuits have employed nearly identical analyses.113
109 See id. at 650-51. Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 refers to "civil
actions," Rule 2 refers to "one form of action-the civil action," Rule 3 describes the com-
mencement of a "civil action," and Rule 54(b) specifies that "an 'action' may contain several
'claims' so that 'any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims ...
does not end the action as to any of the claims."' Id. at 651 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 1, 2, 3,
54(b) (emphasis in Tolbert at 651)).
110 Id.
111 As the Fourth Circuit noted, section 1915(a)(2) identifies forms a prisoner must file to
"bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(2)) Section 1915(b) provides that a prisoner who "'brings a civil action or files an
appeal' IFP' must gradually pay the filing fee in installments. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(e)(2) "explains that the court 'shall dismiss the case,' notwith-
standing partial payment of fees, if the 'action or appeal' does not state a claim or is frivolous
or malicious." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). Additionally, section 1915(f)(1) in-
terchangeably uses "action" and "suit." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1)). In support of the
proposition that language used within the same statute is presumed to have the same meaning,
the Fourth Circuit cited Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 501 (1998).
112 Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Although the District of
Columbia Circuit's holding on this point seems to cover all mixed dismissals, it bears noting
that the Circuit seems to stray into the terrain of the Sixth Circuit--contemplating a situation
where a mixed dismissal involves some claims with merit and some without. Id. ("[I]t would
make no sense to say-where one claim within an action is dismissed for failing to state a
claim and another succeeds on the merits-that the 'action' had been dismissed for failing to
state a claim."). This example-where part of a case has merit and part does not-is not the
procedural posture that is typically most vexing for courts. The far more difficult scenario is
when a mixed dismissal involves immunity or exhaustion issues-which do not, on their own,
squarely fall within the terms "frivolous," "malicious," or "fails to state a claim"-and claims
dismissed on strike grounds.
113 Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Washington v.
Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e assess a PLRA
strike only when the 'case as a whole' is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.");
Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the Third Circuit agreed
"with the majority of our sister courts of appeals that § 1915(g) requires that a prisoner's entire
action be dismissed on enumerated grounds for the dismissal to count as a strike"). The Third
Circuit went a step beyond all other circuits, adopting an explicit rule that:
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Given the divergent-and irreconcilable-interpretations of
§ 1915(g)'s three strikes rule, there is no obvious resolution to the circuit
split over mixed dismissals. It will likely persist until the Supreme Court
visits the issue or Congress amends the statute.
1H. lmmI4Nwr DANGER
Even when a court determines that a prisoner has accumulated three
or more strikes, in forma pauperis status is still available if the litigant
alleges "imminent danger of serious physical injury."1 14 This standard
can be broken into two main components: (1) whether a prisoner faces
"imminent" danger; and (2) whether a physical injury is "serious."115 As
with the three strikes terminology, the PLRA "does not define the term
'imminent danger.'"11 6 However, most courts of appeals agree that in
assessing whether a danger is "imminent," courts must assess the condi-
tions the prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed." 7 Some
[A] strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or appeal is (1) dis-
missed explicitly because it is 'frivolous,' 'malicious,' or 'fails to state a claim' or
(2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to dismis-
sals for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 126.
114 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018). There are various issues regarding the imminent danger
exception for which there is little published case law. For example, if the face of a complaint
does not allege imminent danger, but the allegations in the complaint suggest that a prisoner
may be able to allege imminent danger, is a district court required to order a prisoner to show
cause (or file a response or brief explaining) why the complaint should not be dismissed under
§ 1915(g)? Or, may a district court simply dismiss the complaint because a prisoner has three
strikes? In other words, it is not clear whether a litigant must foresee the applicability of the
three-strikes rule and preemptively allege imminent danger, or if a court has an obligation to
develop the record as to imminent danger.
115 Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the "immi-
nent danger of serious physical injury" requirement consists of two "portions"-imminent
danger, and serious physical injury).
116 Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
117 See, e.g., Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1053 ("[I]t is the circumstances at the time of the filing
of the complaint that matters for purposes of the 'imminent danger' exception . . . ."); Cairpag-
lini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that when a prisoner alleges "only a
past injury that has not recurred, courts deny them leave to proceed IFP"); Malik v. McGinnis,
293 F.3d 559, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that because "§ 1915(g) uses the present tense
in setting forth the imminent danger exception, it is clear from the face of the statute that the
danger must exist at the time the complaint is filed."); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d
307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("[A] prisoner may invoke the 'imminent danger' exception
only to seek relief from a danger which is 'imminent' at the time the complaint is filed.");
Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Congress' use of the present tense
in § 1915(g) confirms that a prisoner's allegation that he faced imminent danger sometime in
the past is an insufficient basis to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis . . . ."); Bafilos v.
O'Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("the language of § 1915(g), by using
the present tense, clearly refers to the time when the action or appeal is filed."); Ashely v.
Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("[The statute's use of the present
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circuits have also held that "a three-strikes prisoner may be required to
demonstrate imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal is filed in
order to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal." 118 As the Ninth Circuit
has conceded, however, "if a prisoner is denied forma pauperis status on
appeal on the ground that he no longer faces an imminent danger, his
inability to pay the filing fee may deprive a court of appeals of the oppor-
tunity to correct any errors committed by the district court."' 19 The rigid-
ity of § 1915(g) may be the reason most circuits have adopted a
malleable pleading standard for the imminent danger exception. After all,
a prisoner facing mistreatment by corrections officers, serious injuries
requiring medical attention, confinement in a special housing unit, or any
number of other circumstances may not have immediate access to writing
materials to dash off a federal complaint or notice of appeal.
A. Pleading Imminent Danger
On the whole, most courts of appeals have set a low bar for estab-
lishing imminent danger so as to allow an action to proceed. The Second
and Seventh Circuits have acknowledged that courts "'should not make
an overly detailed inquiry into whether the allegations qualify for the
[imminent danger] exception,' because § 1915(g) 'concerns only a
threshold question,' while '[s]eparate PLRA provisions are directed at
screening out meritless suits early on." 120 The Ninth Circuit has cau-
tioned that courts should liberally construe prisoner complaints and that
the relevant inquiry is whether a facial review shows that there is "a
plausible allegation" of imminent danger so as to warrant a grant of in
tense verbs 'bring' and 'is' demonstrates [that] an otherwise ineligible prisoner is only eligible
to proceed IFP if he is in imminent danger at the time of filing (emphasis in original)).
118 Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Ball v. Famigho,
726 F.3d 448, 467 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003);
Choyce v. Dominguez, 160 F.3d 1068, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1998).
119 Williams, 775 F.3d at 1089. The Ninth Circuit added: "Although the PLRA was in-
tended to impose the costs of litigation on prisoners, its purposes do not extend as far as
immunizing erroneous district court decisions." Id.
120 Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Andrews, 493 F.3d
at 1055); see also Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
§ 1915(g) "is not a vehicle for determining the merits of a claim," and noting that to treat
imminent danger as anything more than a facial, threshold issue would require "a complicated
set of rules about what conditions are serious enough, all for a simple statutory provision
governing when a prisoner must pay the filing fee for his claim. This is not required . . . .").
The Second Circuit has also applied the standard that pro se pleadings should be construed
liberally and that pro se complaints should not be dismissed without leave to amend when a
liberal reading suggests that a colorable claim may be stated. Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170. The
Third, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have also required that imminent dan-
ger allegations be construed liberally. Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th
Cir. 2013); Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006); McAlphin v.
Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 2002); Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 966 (3d Cir. 1998).
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forma pauperis status. 12 1 The Ninth Circuit added that this lenient stan-
dard for pleading imminent danger is especially appropriate for a court of
appeals, "which, unlike a district court, is ill-equipped to engage in satel-
lite litigation and adjudicate disputed factual matters."1 22 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has referred to the "imminent danger exception [as] essentially a
pleading requirement" where a prisoner must merely allege facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn that there was an existing
danger when the complaint was filed.1 23 The Eleventh Circuit has in-
structed that, even when some allegations of imminent danger may be
insufficient, courts must examine a "complaint, as a whole," and "must
construe [the complaint] liberally," accepting as true the allegations
within.1 24 Under this beneficent interpretation, when a complaint has
some allegation of imminent danger, the Eleventh Circuit has allowed it
to proceed in forma pauperis.1 25
B. What Is "Imminent?"
While there seems to be a consensus that imminent danger must
exist at the time of filing, what qualifies as "imminent" is less clear.
What about dangers that are lurking, recurring, part of a pattern, or ongo-
ing? In cases where a serious danger looms or poses a threat of happen-
ing, is it "imminent?"1 26
The circuits that have addressed this issue have generally added
elasticity to the "imminent danger" requirement, albeit on a case-by-case
basis. The Second Circuit has determined that an "allegation of a recent
brutal beating, combined with three separate threatening incidents, some
of which involved officers who purportedly participated in that beating,
is clearly the sort of ongoing pattern of acts that satisfies the imminent
danger exception."1 27 The Ninth Circuit found imminent danger when
confronted with allegations that a prisoner was receiving "'constant,
daily threats of irreparable harm, injury and death, due to the prison offi-
cials and defendants revealing to other inmates (where the appellant is
incarcerated) that the appellant is, allegedly, a convicted sex offender and
121 Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2015).
122 Id. at 1190.
123 Vandiver, 727 F.3d at 585 (quoting Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App'x 488,
492 (6th Cir. 2012)).
124 Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004).
125 Id. at 1349.
126 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (considering
whether "allegations of an ongoing injury, a recurring injury, or a pattern of misconduct likely
to produce imminent harm" fulfill the "imminent danger" requirement).
127 Chavis, 618 F.3d at 170. The Second Circuit noted that "the additional assertions that
Chavis included in his motion for a preliminary injunction-that some sixteen Defendants had
threatened him with injury or death on about a dozen occasions in the previous several
weeks-render his claim to the imminent danger exception even stronger." Id. at 170-71.
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child molester, which is not true.' "128 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has
ruled that imminent danger exists when there is a pattern of threats and
harm spanning several years. 12 9
Because "imminent danger" involves a fact-specific inquiry, case
law provides only a handful of guiding principles. For example, the Sev-
enth Circuit has acknowledged that a past injury that has not returned
cannot be imminent, but this suggests that a recurring injury may be im-
minent.1 30 The Third Circuit has specified that an imminent danger is
one that is "about to occur at any moment or [is] impending," but if a
danger has already occurred, it is not "imminent."131 The Ninth Circuit
has adopted a broad benchmark for assessing persisting dangers: "it is
sufficient for the prisoner to allege that he faces an 'ongoing danger,'
even if he is not 'directly exposed to the danger at the precise time he
filed the complaint.' " 3 2 To this end, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a
prisoner alleging that "prison officials continue with a practice that has
injured him or others similarly situated in the past will satisfy the 'ongo-
ing danger' standard" for purposes of both the filing of a complaint or an
appeal with in forma pauperis status.1 33
While most courts of appeals have extended "imminent" to mean
ongoing" or "recurring," few have specified whether a prisoner must
allege that there is a connection between the imminent danger and the
underlying allegations. Only the Second Circuit has held that "there must
be a nexus between the imminent danger a three-strikes prisoner alleged
to obtain [in forma pauperis] status and the legal claims asserted in his
128 Williams, 775 F.3d at 1190. The Ninth Circuit had issued an order to show cause why
her in forma pauperis status should not be revoked, and Williams, a prisoner, responded that
she faced imminent danger because the defendants had spread a rumor that she was a con-
victed child molester and inmates threatened to kill her and specified how they would do it. Id.
at 1187, 1190.
129 See Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998). Specifically, in Ashley, an
inmate informed prison officials in 1993 that he was being housed near inmates on his "enemy
list." Id. In June 1996, corrections officials threatened to move Ashley near a known enemy
with the intention that Ashley would be harmed, and in July 1996 Ashley was attacked when
he was placed near an enemy. Id. In May 1997, Ashley again notified corrections officials that
he was being housed near listed enemies, and in June 1997 he was again attacked by an
enemy. Id. Ashley filed a federal complaint in July 1997. Id. at 716.
130 Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003).
131 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
132 Williams, 775 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
133 Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1056-57; see also Williams, 775 F.3d at 1189 (adopting An-
drews and applying it to the consideration of "imminent danger" at the time a notice of appeal
is filed).
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complaint." 134 Several courts of appeals have mentioned the nexus issue,
but have declined to reach it.135
C. Serious Physical Injury
Even if a prisoner can allege "imminent danger," he must also show
that he faces "serious physical injury."136 General, conclusory assertions
are insufficient to show serious physical injury; rather, there must be
"specific fact aflegations." 13 7 The types of "serious physical injury" that
have satisfied this exception run the gamut.
134 Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating "we think that the
statute requires that the prisoner's complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of serious
physical injury and that this danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged in the
complaint."). The Third Circuit, in an unpublished decision, has indicated in dicta that a nexus
is required. Ball v. Hummel, 577 F. App'x 96, 96 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
135 Hummel, 577 F. App'x at 96 n.1. The Ninth Circuit, in dicta, seems to adopt the nexus
test. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1187, 1190 (noting that defendants argued that there was no nexus
between the imminent danger alleged on appeal and the allegations in the underlying com-
plaint and concluding that a response to an order to show cause "alleges an ongoing danger ...
that arises from the conduct of the original Defendants."). The Eleventh, District of Columbia,
and Sixth Circuits have declined to reach the issue. See Barber v. Krepp, 680 F. App'x 819,
821 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) ("[W]e need not decide in the present case whether
§ 1915(g)'s 'imminent danger' exception requires proof of such a nexus [between an imminent
physical injury and the claims in the complaint]."); Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services, 797 F.3d 1069, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[Tlhis court has not resolved whether
§ 1915(g) requires that there be some nexus between the imminent danger alleged and the
prisoner's underlying claim," and "[wle do not resolve that issue in this case."); Vandiver v.
Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[W]e decline to reach
whether § 1915(g) incorporates a nexus requirement.").
136 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018). The modified "physical" may be construed to prevent
prisoners suffering from imminent mental or emotional injury from satisfying the "imminent
danger" exception. The Seventh Circuit has so held. See Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957,
959-60 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting claim that a "deteriorating mental state" satisfied the immi-
nent danger exception, explaining that "[m]ental deterioration ... is a psychological rather
than a physical problem" and that "[p]risoners facing long-term psychological problems can
save up during that long term and pay the filing fee."). The Seventh Circuit seems to presume
that a prisoner suffering from psychological problems is eligible for, and capable of, maintain-
ing a paying job inside of a prison. In any event, despite the distinction the Seventh Circuit
drew between physical and psychological harms, the Circuit nonetheless found that Sanders
could allege imminent danger of serious physical harm because the prison had classified Sand-
ers as "seriously mentally ill" and he had previously "attempted self-harm multiple times." Id.
at 960. The Seventh Circuit thus crafted the following standard: "When the prospect of self-
harm is a consequence of the condition that prompted the suit, a court should treat the allega-
tion (if true) as imminent physical injury." Id. at 961.
137 Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003) (determining that "conclusory
assertions that defendants were trying to kill Martin by forcing him to work in extreme condi-
tions despite his blood pressure condition" was insufficient to allege serious physical injury);
see also Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011) (reiterating
pleading standard for serious physical injury described in White); White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d
1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998) (determining that "vague and utterly conclusory assertions"
and a complaint containing "no specific reference as to which of the defendants may have
denied him what medication or treatment for what ailment on what occasion" was insufficient
to establish a serious physical injury under § 1915(g)).
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The Eleventh Circuit has found "serious physical injury" when a
prisoner with FIV and hepatitis was deprived of medications for these
"deteriorating" conditions, causing him to suffer "prolonged skin and
newly developed scalp infections, severe pain in the eyes and vision
problems, fatigue and prolonged stomach pains" and the possibility of
exposure to "'opportunistic infections, such as pneumonia, esophageal
candidiasis, salmonella, and wasting syndrome,' which would cause him
to die sooner." 138 The Eighth Circuit considered a claim of serious physi-
cal injury based on the denial of three "immediate dental extractions,"
which caused an infection of the gums to spread, the need for two addi-
tional extractions, and pain so extreme that the prisoner attempted sui-
cide. 139 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the risk that the infection would
spread, coupled with impending additional tooth extractions, satisfied se-
rious physical injury "as a matter of law." 140 The Third Circuit found
serious physical injury when a prisoner alleged that he was "forced to
breathe particles of dust and lint which were continuously being dis-
persed into his cell through the ventilation system," causing "'severe
headaches, change in voice, mucus that is full of dust and lint, and wa-
tery eyes." 14 1 And the Seventh Circuit has determined that the depriva-
tion of medication to treat bipolar, attention deficit, and panic
disorders-causing a prisoner to endure "heart palpitations, chest pains,
138 Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) ("HIV and hepatitis, and the
alleged danger of more serious afflictions if he is not treated constitute imminent danger of
serious physical injury.").
139 McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 2002) (detailing allegations in the
complaint relevant to serious physical injury); see also Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717
(8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that repeated threats of harm and two inmate attacks was sufficient
to satisfy imminent danger exception).
140 McAlphin, 281 F.3d at 710.
141 Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 965 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit rejected the
defendants' argument that the prisoner merely had a "dusty cell." Id. at 965. Rather, the court
stated that "[i]nmates ought to be able to complain about 'unsafe, life-threatening condition[s]
in their prison' without waiting for something to happen to them. After all, it is the prison
administration, not the inmates, who are in the best position to determine the precise nature of
any such contaminants in those situations where health hazards are not readily apparent to the
unaided senses."). Id. at 965-66. The Second Circuit, in a case involving alleged mold expo-
sure in a gym shower at a correctional facility, found that there was no serious physical injury.
See Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit's decision
does not detail the allegations regarding the mold, how frequent the exposure was, and if there
were any side effects from the exposure. Id. at 155. ("Nor did the District Court err in deter-
mining that Polanco's 'allegations cannot support a determination that he was in imminent
danger' of serious physical injury with respect to his claims relating to the health risks associ-
ated with his exposure to mold or to his claim of unjust discipline."). It is possible-although
the Second Circuit did not state this-that the absence of such specific allegations doomed the
serious physical injury claim.
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labored breathing, choking sensations, and paralysis in his legs and
back"-constituted a serious physical injury under § 1915(g).1 42
Some courts of appeals have drawn more general parameters in de-
fining serious physical injury. For instance, the Sixth Circuit has held
"that a plaintiff who alleges a danger of serious harm due to a failure to
treat a chronic illness or condition satisfies the imminent-danger excep-
tion under § 1915(g), as incremental harm that culminates in a serious
physical injury may present a danger equal to harm that results from an
injury that occurs all at once."1 43 The District of Columbia Circuit has
also held that "a chronic disease that could result in serious harm or even
death constitutes 'serious physical injury.'"144 On the other hand, the
Third Circuit has observed that merely residing in prison, which a pris-
oner alleged to be "a hostile and dangerous environment," did not trigger
imminent danger of serious physical injury.145
In the end, most circuits have framed their "serious physical injury"
analysis in such specific terms that no clear test emerges. However, most
courts of appeals have introduced some flexibility in the application of
this exception, recognizing that the pleading standard for an imminent
danger claim is low, and that seemingly minor conditions can become
exacerbated to the point that they may ultimately present serious physical
injury.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMENDMENT
The inefficiencies of § 1915(g) described above coupled with recent
prominent cases of prison abuses146 beg the question: should Congress
revisit this flawed statute, which effectively prevents three-strike prison-
142 Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 329-30 (7th Cir. 2003). Despite the determination
that the prisoner sufficiently alleged serious physical injury, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint because the prisoner's detailed complaint established
that the prisoner simply disagreed with prison doctors' treatment decisions. Id. at 331.
143 Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., 727 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2013).
144 Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
145 Parker v. Montgomery Cty. Cort. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 F.3d 144, 154 n.
12 (3d Cir. 2017).
146 Rikers Island, alone, sheds light on the innumerable types of abuses that can occur
within a correctional facility, and how dangerous the three strikes bar can be if an inmate is
experiencing abuse but is unable to file a complaint because of the financial impossibility of
paying the full filing fee. See Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Rikers Guard Kicked Ill Inmate to Death,
Prosecutor Says at Trial, N.Y. Tuisus, Dec. 2, 2016; Benjamin Weiser, City to Pay $5.75
Million Over Death of Mentally Ill Inmate at Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2016; Chris-
topher Mele, Correction Officer Is Charged With Raping Rikers Island Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2016; Winnie Hu & Kate Pastor, Trial of 5 Rikers Guards Brings Out Culture of
Violence at Jail, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2016 (describing correction officers' wanton use of
excessive force against inmates, planting of "evidence" to frame an inmate, and securing
lengthy punishment in solitary confinement for the trumped-up charges and guilty
determinations).
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ers from bringing potentially meritorious lawsuits (unless they can pay
hundreds of dollars in filing fees) and largely fails to aid court effi-
ciency? Relatedly, should other exceptions-such as for meritorious law-
suits-be added? And, should Congress omit § 1915(g)'s mandatory
language so that courts may exercise their discretion on how to most
efficiently process the cases before them?
A. The Fiction that All Prisoners Can "Save Up" and Pay a Filing
Fee
When three-strikes prisoners have challenged § 1915(g) because it
effectively "block[s] a prisoner's access to the federal courts," judges
have routinely pointed out that § 1915(g) "only denies the prisoner of the
privilege of filing before he has acquired the necessary filing fee." 147
This retort, however, assumes that prisoners are able to earn sufficient
income while incarcerated to pay a filing fee. In the federal prison sys-
tem, "[s]entenced inmates who are physically and mentally able to work
are required to participate in the work program"; however, "drug treat-
ment programming, education, or vocational training may be substituted
for all or part of the work program." 14 8 For those able to work, their
hourly salary may range from $0.12 to $0.40 in the federal system.149
Whether an inmate is assigned to full-time, part-time, or no work detail is
determined on a case-by-case basis.150 Thus, not every prisoner is em-
ployed while incarcerated, and, if given a job, the number of hours of
work assigned can fluctuate.
Additionally, the Bureau of Prisons has a financial plan whereby
prisoners who have financial obligations must pay them in the following
priority: "(1) Special Assessments imposed under 18 U.S.C. 3013; (2)
Court-ordered restitution; (3) Fines and court costs; (4) State or local
court obligations; and (5) Other federal government obligations."' 5 ' Con-
sequently, even those prisoners who secure regular employment may not
be able to save sufficient funds to pay a filing fee because other obliga-
tions must be paid first. Accordingly, some prisoners, if subject to the
three-strikes bar, may effectively be prevented from filing any federal
litigation-including meritorious claims. It is a fiction to believe that all
prisoners can, in the words of the Seventh Circuit, "save up . .. and pay
the filing fee."1 5 2
147 See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001).
148 28 C.F.R. § 545.20(a)(2) (1996).
149 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Work Programs, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
custody and-care/work-programs.jsp (last visited December 3, 2018).
150 28 C.F.R. § 545.23(a) (1996).
151 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a) (1999).
152 Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that "[p]risoners facing
long-term psychological problems can save up during that long term and pay the filing fee.").
2018] 235
236 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28:207
Considering how difficult it is for courts to undergo the mental
arithmetic to determine whether certain dismissals are strikes, it should
come as no surprise that prisoners may not know that they are subject to
the three strikes rule until after filing a complaint and learning they are
liable for the entire filing fee.' 5 3 Under these circumstances, courts typi-
cally provide a prisoner thirty days to pay the full filing fee, or their
action will be dismissed without prejudice.1 54 If a prisoner does not have
hundreds of dollars at his immediate disposal, the three strikes determi-
nation is effectively dispositive-even if the underlying lawsuit has
merit. Yet, this outcome seems at odds with the legislative history for the
PLRA. As Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the PLRA's sponsors, stated dur-
ing congressional debate: "I do not want to prevent inmates from raising
legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent those claims from
being raised."I55 Yet, with the primary focus on three strikes and immi-
nent danger, § 1915(g) does not allow even the most cursory review of a
complaint or appeal to be sure no meritorious claims are being wholesale
dismissed.
Not only do three-strikes prisoners bear the burden of accumulating
sufficient funds to pay a filing fee and costs, they must do so before the
applicable statute of limitations period runs. Because state-law statutes of
limitation apply to suits in federal court raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
there is no single limitations period that applies.1 56 Some limitations pe-
riods are as short as one year.' 57 Whether a prisoner earning as a little as
$0.12 an hour, who may be obligated to pay special assessments or court-
ordered restitution before any other fees or costs, can earn $350 or more
153 See Furnace v. Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that it is not
until a defendant raises a three-strikes argument that the court will then determine if a prisoner
has three strikes); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (cautioning against
counting individual strikes before a prisoner has accumulated three of them).
133 See Snider, 199 F.3d at 115, 116 (stating that the "designation of strikes has no practical
consequences until a defendant in a prisoner's lawsuit raises the contention that the prisoner's
suit or appeal may not be maintained in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because
the prisoner has accumulated three strikes.").
154 See, e.g., McFadden v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 270 F. Supp. 3d 82, 87-90 (D.D.C.
2017) (explaining that prisoner had three strikes and did not fall within the imminent danger
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that, rather than dismiss the complaint outright, the
"better procedure" was to revoke in forma pauperis status, order payment of the full filing fee
within thirty days, and dismiss the action without prejudice if the prisoner failed to pay within
that time frame).
155 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
156 See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980) (stating that "Congress did
not establish a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules applicable to actions brought in
federal court under § 1983 . . . . When such a void occurs, this Court has repeatedly 'bor-
rowed' the state law of limitations governing and analogous cause of action.").
157 See, e.g., Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that "Ten-
nessee's limitations period for actions brought under federal civil rights statutes or for personal
injuries is one year.").
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to pay a federal filing fee (and other costs) within one year of an incident
is questionable.15 8 Further, there is a dearth of litigation exploring
whether equitable tolling could save a complaint filed late because a
three-strikes prisoner lacked funds to pay a filing fee within the limita-
tions period.1 5 9
B. Courts are in the Best Position to Manage Their Dockets and
Frequent Filers
Although the PLRA was supposed to ease the burden on courts,
and, presumably, § 1915(g) was meant to enable courts to quickly iden-
tify three-strike litigants, this has not been the case. As the discussion
above shows, it is surprisingly tricky to determine whether certain dis-
missals constitute strikes. When a lower court's § 1915(g) analysis is
flawed, a case may be appealed, remanded, and appealed again-simply
on the threshold issue of whether a litigant is eligible to file a complaint
in forma pauperis.1'o Alternatively, a prisoner may forgo appellate re-
view of a three strikes determination, unable to afford an appellate dock-
eting fee, and any errors in a district court's three strikes arithmetic may
go uncorrected.' 6 ' Rather than go through this time-consuming game of
ping-pong, consuming judicial resources over a threshold determination,
courts may be better served by having the discretion to simply proceed to
a 28 U.S.C. § 1915A screening.
Under § 1915A, courts "shall review . . . a complaint in a civil ac-
tion in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or of-
ficer or employee of a governmental entity," and "dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-(1) is frivolous, mali-
158 See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a) (1999) (setting forth a "financial plan" for federal prisoners
and establishing the order in which financial obligations are paid from a prisoner's account);
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (filing fee for district court action is $350).
159 See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755-56 (2016)
(explaining that equitable tolling involves a two-prong test: (1) that a litigant has pursued his
rights diligently; and (2) "where the circumstances that caused a litigant's delay are both ex-
traordinary and beyond its control").
160 See Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 655 (4th Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding
because litigant did not have three strikes); see also Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351
(11th Cir. 2004) (reversing and remanding because litigant's proposed amended complaint
alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury and litigant was not barred by the three
strikes rule).
161 See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting) (outlining dangers of three strikes bar and its ability to prevent prisoners from
proceeding with "potentially meritorious litigation at the filing stage, with no opportunity for
substantive review or appeal."). The dissent in Abdul-Akbar noted that a lenient interpretation
of § 1915(g) was necessary considering the "preclusive effect" of this provision, and that the
denial of in forma pauperis status and "resultant dismissal of prison litigation made pursuant
thereto will be effectively unreviewable, as a truly indigent plaintiff will no more be able to
afford the requisite filing costs for appeal of that dismissal than for the underlying action." Id.
at 321.
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cious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. .. ."162
When a complaint raises the baseless types of claims discussed during
congressional hearings about the PLRA-complaints about being served
creamy rather than chunky peanut butter and dissatisfaction with the
brand of prison-issued sneakers 163-it would be far more efficient to
simply dismiss a case at the screening stage rather than force courts to go
through the rigmarole of identifying three distinct strikes and evaluating
whether there is any indication of imminent danger of serious physical
harm. The screening process would also eliminate the possibility of dis-
missing meritorious claims-something PLRA sponsors insisted would
not happen-simply because a prisoner is unable to pay the full filing
fee. 164
Replacing a mandatory three strikes scheme with § 1915A's simple
screening mechanism is especially important when considering prisoners
serving lengthy or life sentences. Because § 1915(g) has no time limit, if
a prisoner accumulates three strikes in the early years of serving a sen-
tence, all manner of non-physical harm may befall him and, unless suffi-
cient funds can be raised, the prisoner is barred from seeking federal
redress. As several Third Circuit judges acknowledged in a dissenting
opinion, some prisoners "whose 'strikes' were racked up without any bad
faith or abuse" subsequently face § 1915(g)'s bar of even "potentially
meritorious litigation at the filing stage, with no opportunity for substan-
tive review or appeal."165
A final shortcoming presented by § 1915(g) is that it forces judges
through the maze of calculating strikes and evaluating imminent danger
while depriving them of the opportunity to triage a case in a more effec-
tive manner and tailor appropriate sanctions when presented with a fre-
quent filer. Outside of § 1915(g), litigants-prisoners and non-prisoners
alike-who abuse the litigation process are subject to a variety of sanc-
tions fashioned to meet the degree of misconduct presented. Authority to
impose sanctions comes from various sources-28 U.S.C. § 1927; Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26, 37, and 41(b); and, as the Supreme
Court has observed, "a district court possesses inherent powers that are
'governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expe-
ditious disposition of cases."' 166 Accordingly, sanctions may take a vari-
162 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1) (1996).
163 141 CONG. REc. 14,629 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("Top 10 Frivolous Inmate
Lawsuits Nationally").
164 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
165 Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 320 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
166 Dietz v. Boudlin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980)
(stating that any person "who so multiples the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
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ety of appearances-from monetary sanctions to the imposition of filing
injunctions, or even civil or criminal contempt.1 67 Filing injunctions can
be molded to fit a particular litigant's style of abuse-from "completely
foreclosing the filing of designated categories of cases" to imposing the
"less drastic remedy of subjecting a vexatious litigant to a 'leave of
court' requirement with respect to future filings."168 In imposing sanc-
tions, courts typically provide a litigant with notice and an opportunity to
be heard; courts may consider a litigant's response-and whether he pro-
vides a satisfactory explanation, or expresses repentance-to determine
what sanction, if any, would be most appropriate.1 69 Generally, when
fashioning a sanction to curb a vexatious litigant's misconduct, courts are
instructed to weigh alternative lesser sanctions and impose the least re-
strictive, yet effective, penalty.1 70
Considering the variety of mechanisms courts have to manage vexa-
tious litigants, it is curious that § 1915(g) eliminates this panoply of
sanctions and instead invokes a single, nationwide filing injunction once
a prisoner has filed three unsuccessful actions or appeals. Indeed, when a
non-prisoner is subjected to a filing injunction of similar scope and force,
it is only after exhibiting such a complete disregard and abuse of the
litigation process-such as by filing hundreds of frivolous actions and
appeals-that no lesser sanction could be effective. 171 And, even when a
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."); FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c) (permit-
ting a court, on motion or on its own initiative, to sanction a litigant-after providing notice
and an opportunity to respond-so as to "deter repetition of the conduct"; stating the sanction
may consist of a monetary penalty or "nonmonetary directives"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3)
(providing for sanctions for improper certification); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing for sanctions
for various discovery abuses); FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing for involuntary dismissal of an
action for failure to prosecute).
167 In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1993) (collecting cases to show that
the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals have all imposed filing bars on vexatious
litigants).
168 Id.
169 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (observing that, "[1]ike
other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice
and an opportunity for a hearing on the record.").
170 Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (stat-
ing that, in fashioning a sanction, "courts should consider whether other, less restrictive op-
tions, are adequate to protect the court and parties."); see also In re Ross, 858 F.3d 779, 787
(3d Cir. 2017) (determining that a filing injunction is an "'extreme remed[y]' that 'should be
narrowly tailored and sparingly used."' (quoting In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 747
(3d Cir. 1989))).
171 See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256 (2d Cir. 1984) (reviewing a district
court order that "broadly enjoins appellant, inter alia, from instituting litigation in any . ..
federal court without fulfilling certain conditions."). The Second Circuit noted that the litigant
being sanctioned had filed "literally hundreds of lawsuits, motions and miscellaneous plead-
ings, all but a [ ] fraction of which lack any merit whatsoever." Id. Accordingly, the Court
ruled that it viewed "the restrictions placed upon Martin-Trigona's bringing of new actions in
all federal district courts as necessary and proper." Id. at 1262. Other Circuits have also ex-
pressed caution in the breadth of a filing injunction, and what behavior necessitates the imposi-
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filing injunction is entered, a litigant may still seek leave of a court to file
a new action or appeal-and may even seek to do so in forma
pauperis. 17 2
Given the variety of resources for courts to manage their dockets,
§ 1915(g)'s filing bar should be eliminated. It is at odds with the proce-
dure applicable to imposing a sanction in any other context, and it oper-
ates so as to bar prisoners who are financially unable to pay the full filing
fee from presenting any claims, no matter how meritorious. As even the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[a]n erroneous trial court dismissal
might wrongly deprive a prisoner of in forma pauperis status with re-
spect to lawsuits filed after a dismissal but before its reversal on ap-
peal." 173 By returning the sanctioning power back to the courts and
eliminating the reflexive application of the three-strikes bar, judges will
be in a position to manage their dockets in the most effective manner
without permanently precluding indigent prisoners from seeking redress
in the federal courts.
tion of one. See Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987) (considering whether
a filing injunction was appropriate after a litigant filed seven actions, and remanding to the
district court because the filing injunction was imposed on a pro se litigant without adequate
notice and opportunity to respond); see also Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir.
1980) (stating that "litigiousness alone will not support an injunction against a plaintiff," "the
use of such measures against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with particular caution,"
and that the court expected that "injunctions against litigants will remain very much the excep-
tion to the general rule of free access to the courts.").
172 See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (determining that filing in-
junction imposed against litigant who "deluged" the courts with a "parade of pleadings, peti-
tions and other papers" was proper, and noting that the pro se litigant could still file "a new
and legitimate complaint" and was "free to seek to proceed in the district court (and this court
on appeal, if necessary) in forma pauperis" so long as he first sought leave of the court and
indicated on what basis he believed his new claims had merit).
173 Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015). The Supreme Court concluded
that the risk that a prisoner will be barred from appealing an erroneous three strikes determina-
tion did not "seem great," and relied on representations by the Solicitor General that he was
only able to find two instances when a Court of Appeals reversed a district court's issuance of
a third strike. Id. However, a review of three strikes appeals shows more than two published
opinions where courts of appeals reversed a district court's three strikes determination. See,
e.g., Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1012-14 (7th Cir. 2010) ("we conclude that Mr. Turley
has not incurred three strikes . . . and remains eligible for IFP status," and "the judgment of the
district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to reconsider whether Mr.
Turley may proceed IFP" based on indigence); see also Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121
(9th Cir. 2005) (determining that the district court's three strikes analysis was erroneous be-
cause the court failed to "consider[ ] the underlying order[] or mak[e] an independent assess-
ment of whether the prior cases were frivolous or malicious or failed to state a claim" so as to
fall under § 1915(g)); see also Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 655 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Be-
cause none of these actions counts as a strike under § 1915(g), we find that the district court
erred in denying Tolbert the right to proceed IFP in this suit on the ground that he had three
strikes."); Owens v. Isaac, 487 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 2007), 563 (determining prisoner had one
strike and district court incorrectly assessed three strikes and barred prisoner from proceeding
IFP under § 1915(g)).
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CONCLUSION
To the extent the PLRA sought to achieve a reduction in prisoner
filings, its garnishment procedure and screening mechanism in § 1915A
combine to create an economic disincentive to filing and a swift proce-
dure for courts to dismiss bogus claims. Section 1915(g), however, goes
too far. The three-strikes language has proven problematic for courts to
apply and has generated inconsistent approaches across courts of appeals.
Its indefinite bar from future in forma pauperis filings is overly broad,
and there is no mechanism to save meritorious claims unless an indigent
three-strikes prisoner is able to somehow obtain hundreds of dollars for
filing costs and fees. The latter, in particular, runs afoul of Congress's
intent in passing the first in forma pauperis statute in 1892. As the Su-
preme Court has recognized, "that statute is intended to guarantee that no
citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend
an action, civil or criminal, 'in any court of the United States' solely
because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs." 17 4 Indeed, prior to the passage of § 1915(g), the Supreme Court
held that "[u]nless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would
be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant, . . . the request of an
indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed." 7 5 For
§ 1915(g) to operate so as to require a three-strikes litigant to pay the full
filing fee as a condition precedent to filing a potentially meritorious
claim defies not only the purpose of the original in forma pauperis stat-
ute, but of the fundamental right to seek redress for wrongs in a court of
law. 176
174 Adkins, 335 U.S. at 342.
175 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (per curiam).
176 As the Supreme Court recognized in Marbury v. Madison, the "essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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